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INTERPRETING RULE 60(B)(6) OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE': LIMITATIONS ON
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS FOR "ANY OTHER
REASON"

I. INTRODUCTION

Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attempts to strike a
balance between the competing interests of finality of judgments and
practical justice.2 This Note explores how the rule has been construed by
the United States Supreme Court and the First Circuit. Specifically, this
Note examines the Rule's "any other reason" clause.3 This Note attempts
to define the limits on the reservation of equitable discretion in the
1

FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

2

FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) provides:

Relief from Judgment or Order
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a
party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying
relief from operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not effect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a
defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., Sec
1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis,
coram vobis, audit querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of
review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. Id.
3 See id. Rule 60(b)(6) provides in pertinent part: "(6) any other reason justifying
relief from operation of the judgment" Id.
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reviewing court, and to discern definitive standards that courts use when
deciding whether or not to exercise their discretionary power under the
clause.4 Part I traces the history of the clause from its amendment in 1948,
through its interpretation in several Supreme Court cases. 5 Part II examines
how the First Circuit interprets the "extraordinary circumstances,"
"reasonable time limit," and "any other reason" clauses of the Rule.6 Part
III compares the First Circuit's interpretation of the Rule with the
established Supreme Court standards and concludes with a list of the
standards and a discussion of the limitations on the court's reservation of
equitable powers.
II. HISTORY
Rule 60 was amended in 1948 to include Rule 60(b)(6). Congress
enacted the amendment to abolish the federal courts use of common law
writs that had previously been grounds for relief from final judgments.8
The legislative intent was to codify specific grounds for relief from
some equitable power in the court to do
judgments, while reserving
"practical justice." 9 Afterward, Rule 60(b)(6) was referred to as a
"savings" or "catch-all" clause.10
Immediately following the drafting of Rule 60 (b)(6), legal scholars
expressed concern over the "grand reservoir of equitable power" the clause
afforded to the reviewing courts." Since the amendment, the Supreme
Court has developed several standards in its use of 60(b)(6), helping to
further define limits on the loosely-drafted clause. 12 In two cases involving
denaturalization proceedings with similar factual situations, Klapprott v.
United States13 and Ackermann v. United States,14the Court 15made several
distinctions about when a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is applicable.
4 See id.
5 See infra notes 8-28.
6

See infra notes 33-79.

7 See U.S.C.S. FED. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (2000) (explaining history of amendments).

8 See id.
9 See id
10 See Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Relief from Civil Judgments, 61YALE L.J. 77,81
(1952)(explaining how 60(b)(6) provided way for courts to circumvent time limitations in
60(b) (1-5)).
1 See JAMES WM. MOORE ET. AL., MooREs's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.27 (2000).
See generally Note 61 Yale L.J. 77,81 (1952); Scott A. Weathers, The "Savings" Clause of
Trial Rule 60(B): Muddy Waters?, 21 IND L.J. 73, 75 (1988)(discussing Indiana state
court's court use of discretion led to inconsistent precedent); Comment, TemporalAspects
of the Finality of Judgments-The Significance of Federal Rule 60(b), 17 U of Chi. L. Rev
664, 672-673 (analyzing Supreme Court's broad use of discretion in Klapprott decision).
12 See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The Rule states in pertinent part: "(6) any other
reason justifying relief from operation of the judgment." Id.
13 69 S.Ct. 384 (1949).
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In Klapprott, a naturalized
through a default proceeding.16
judgment, holding that the facts
circumstances, which brought the
clause of Rule 60(b)(6). 7

citizen was deprived of his citizenship
A divided court vacated the default
in the case constituted extraordinary
motion within the "any other reason"

When confronted with a similar situation in Ackermann, the Court
came to a different conclusion.1 8 The petitioner, a naturalized citizen, lost
his citizenship through a default proceeding.' 9 In Ackermann, the
petitioner did not seek an appeal within the statute of limitations period, as
was suggested to him by an Immigration and Naturalization Services
("INS") agent. 20 Based upon these facts, the Supreme Court held that the
default judgment could not be vacated because there was no showing of
"extraordinary circumstances," and therefore, the judgment fell outside the
2
realm of Klapprott. 1
In cases following the Ackermann decision, the Court set out more
restrictions on the use of a 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment.22 In
Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp.,23 the Court vacated a lower
court decision holding in which the judge refused to disqualify himself in
14

71 S. Ct 209 (1950).

15 See Klapprott v. United States , 69 S. Ct. 384, 390 (vacating default judgment upon
finding of extraordinary circumstances justifying relief under 60 (b)(6)); Ackermann, 71 S.
Ct. 209, 213 (denying 60(b)(6) motion to vacate judgment based on lack of showing of
extraordinary circumstances).
16 Klapprott, 69 S. Ct. at 390.
17 Id. at 389-390. Justice Black's majority opinion classifies
the petitioner's situation
as one of extraordinary circumstances. Id. Petitioner moved after the one-year time
limitation for the other grounds of Rule 60. Id. The Court explained that he was no more
able to defend hi nself than he would have been had he never received notice of the charges
because he was ill, imprisoned, and destitute. Id. Therefore, his inability to defend himself
against the denaturalization proceeding is not mere neglect, but an extraordinary situation in
which the use of the Rule is warranted. Id.
18 See Ackermann, 71 S Ct. at 209 (denying motion to vacate judgment because
no
extraordinary circumstances).
19 Id. at 210. The petitioner lost his citizenship and did not appeal the order because
he had no money or property other than a home worth $2,500. Id.
20 Id. The petitioners were in the custody of INS agent W.F. Kelly, in whom they

had great confidence. Id. Kelly advised the petitioners not to put up their home to pay for
an appeal, and they followed his advice rather than the advice of their lawyer. Id.
Id. at 213. The Court distinguished the petitioner in Klapprott from the petitioner in
Ackermann for several reasons: "no choice and choice; imprisonment and freedom of
action; no trial and trial; no counsel and counsel; no chance for negligence and inexcusable
negligence." Id.
22 See Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868 1988) (holding
60(b)(6) mutually exclusive from other 60(b) provisions); Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v.
Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P'ship et al., 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993) (suggesting relief under
60(b)(6) granted upon showing of faultlessness of moving party).
23 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
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violation of 28 U.S.C.A. 455(a).24 In deciding if vacatur was the
appropriate remedy, the Court considered three factors: the risks of
injustice to the parties, whether the denial of relief will produce injustice in
other cases, and whether the public's confidence in the judicial process
would be undermined.25 The Court also explained that the six provisions in
Rule 60(b) are mutually exclusive and that 60(b)(6) cannot be used to
avoid the Rule's one year time limitation.2 6
In PioneerInv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc.,27 the Court construed
a bankruptcy rule's neglect provision, and commented on the type of
extraordinary circumstances that would justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6).28
According to the Court, in order to get the benefits of Rule 60(b)(6), a
party must be faultless in the delay of not moving under another applicable
provision of the rule.29
In Link v. Wabash,3 ° the Supreme Court suggested relief under
60(b)(6) might be available in a case of attorney misconduct. 31 Link
involved an attorney who missed a pre-trial conference.32 The district court
judge dismissed the action because of the lawyer's failure to appear. 33 The
court of appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
exercise of its discretionary power pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.34 The Court reasoned that the lack of notice
given to the client was of less consequence because of the availability of a
corrective remedy under Rule 60(b). 5 Although the Court did not analyze
the case under Rule 60(b), the decision suggested a client wronged by an
attorney may have a remedy under the rule.36
III. FIRST CIRCUIT APPLICATION OF RULE 60 (B)(6)
An examination of Rule 60 (b)(6) motions in the First Circuit
reveals several different factual instances where the courts have exercised
24

Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 868.

21
26

Id. at 864.
Id. at 864.

27

507 U.S. 380 (1993).
Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P'ship et al., 507 U.S. 380, 394.

28

Id. at 394.
29 See id. (explaining excusable neglect in 60(b)(l) mutually exclusive from grounds
for 60(b)(6) relief).
30 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
31 See id. at 632. (noting petitioner never used "escape hatch" of Rule
60(b)).
32
33

Id. at 628.

Id. at 629.

Id. at 630-632.
Id. at 632. Although the petitioner in this case did not avail himself of the "escape
hatch" 60(b) remedy, the Court suggested his circumstances might be appropriate for relief
under the rule. Id.
36 See id.
34

35
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their discretion and granted equitable relief. 37 The main criteria used to
evaluate motions made pursuant to 60(b)(6) are set out clearly by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals.38 These general criteria are: the timeliness of
the request, the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying
extraordinary relief, the absence of unfair prejudice to the opposing party,
and reason to believe that vacating the judgment will not be an empty
exercise.39
A. Grounds for Denial of Relief
The two most frequently cited reasons for denying 60(b)(6) motions
are the timeliness and extraordinary circumstances elements of the four
part criteria. 4° The First Circuit also adheres to the requirement that Rule
60(b)(6) cannot be used to substitute for an appeal, or to avoid the strict
one year time limits of the rule. 4 ' The Circuit has denied motions under
37 See Rivera et al v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 921 F.2d 393, 395 (1st Cir. 1990)

(justifying district court use of 60(b)(6) discretion to clarify conflicting court orders);
United States v. Baus, 834 F.2d 1114, 1124 (1st Cir. 1987) (reversing district court after
finding 60(b)(6) extraordinary circumstances consisting of material breach of settlement
agreement); Marderosian v. Town of Spencer, 170 F.R.D. 335, 342 (D. Mass 1997)
(granting relief upon finding of conflict of interest and no actual prejudice to opposing
side); United States v. Belanger, 598 F.Supp 598, 601 (D. Me. 1984) (granting relief from
judgment where court reversed rule after judgment and prior to appeal expiration); Castro
et.al. v. Beecher, 522 F. Supp 873, 876 (D. Mass 1981) (modifying consent decree through
invocation of inherent equitable powers under 60(b)(6)); King v. Mordowanec, 46 F.R.D.
474, 479 (D.R.I. 1969) (granting relief from dismissal where plaintiff unaware of
attorney's gross neglect).
38 See Teamsters et.al. v. Superline Trans. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 19-20 (1st
Cir. 1992)
(outlining three criteria and adding fourth "empty exercise" element).
39 Id. at 20.
40 See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 891 (1st Cir. 1997) (denying relief upon

no showing of exceptional circumstances); Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274, 280 (1st
Cir. 1993) (noting reliance on government official does not present extraordinary
circumstance especially with no timely appeal); Ojeda-Toro v. Rivera-Mendez et al, 853
F.2d 25, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding decision not to appeal bars relief under 60(b)(6)
within inadequate legal representation claim); Scola v. Boat Frances, 618 F.2d 147, 154155 (1 st Cir. 1980) (holding clerk's miscomputation of prejudgment interest not exceptional
circumstance within ambit of clause); Martins v. Charles Hayden Goodwill Inn Sch., 178
F.R.D. 4, 7 (D. Mass 1997) (denying relief where same factual claim brought under
60(b)(6) time-barred within 60(b)(3));United States v. 59.88 Acres of Land, 734 F.Supp.
555, 559 (D. Mass 1990)(holding six- year delay in moving for relief not reasonable time
within 60(b)(6)); Cutler v. Lewiston Daily Sun, 103 F.R.D. 172, 174 (D. Me 1984)
(vacating on alternate grounds while noting plaintiffs lack of compliance with local rule
not extraordinary circumstance); Brown v. Clark Equip. Co., 96 F.R.D. 166, 173 (D. Me.
1982) (denying relief because of failure to appeal, mere change in decisional law not
exceptional circumstance).
41 See Gonzalez, 918 F.2d at 306 (denying 60(b)(3) relief due to late filing and no
extraordinary circumstances under 60(b)(6)); Martins, 178 F.R.D. at 7 (denying appeal
brought one year and a half after final decision); Ahned, 118 F.3d at 891(upholding denial
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the "empty exercise" element.42 Further, the Appeals Court upheld a
district court's denial of a rule 60(b)(6) motion where the district court did
not issue an opinion.43 These decisions demonstrate a petitioner must offer
additional 60(b)(6) reasons for relief besides a need for more time, merely
adding a 60(b)(6) motion to another Rule 60 ground will not be
sufficient. 44
B. Changes of Law
There are several conflicting decisions dealing with changes in
law.45 Two cases in the district court of46Maine are illustrative of the subtle
distinctions that lead to relief or denial.
In Brown v. Clark Equip. Co. 4 7 , the Maine district court denied a
60(b)(6) motion.48 While acknowledging that the Supreme Court had not
directly determined Rule 60(b)(6) relief in a change of law situation, the
court relied on a tenth circuit decision in denying the relief. 49 The plaintiffs
in Brown requested relief from judgment because Maine abolished its
privity requirement eight months after they lost summary judgment due to
lack of privity. 50 The court relied on the plaintiff's choice to proceed in
federal forum as grounds for denying the availability of relief in state
court. 5' If the plaintiff had been forced to proceed in federal court, the

of pro se 60(b)(6) motion due to no meritorious claim or extraordinary circumstances);
Lepore v. Vidockler et al, 792 F.2d at 275 (1st Cir. 1986) (denying relief where no
additional reasons other than 60(b)(3) offered).
42 See Teamsters et al, 953 F.2d at 20 (explaining litigant must provide supporting
documentation with motion, more than mere conclusory allegation); Cotto, 993 F.2d at 280
(finding no suitable showing of meritorious claim or defense).
See Lepore, 792 F.2d at 272 (denying motion dealing with newly discovered
evidence under 60(b)(2) and 60(b)(6)).
44 See supra notes 3842.
45 See Lubben v. Selective Service, 453 F.2d at 652 (1st Cir. 1972)(denying motion to
vacate based on new precedent because no appeal of initial decision); Scola, 618 F.2d at
155 (holding no 60(b)(6) relief where clerk misapplied law because relief available under
60(b)(l)); Brown, 96 F.R.D. at 175 (holding change in decisional law not extraordinary
circumstance); Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d at 468 (1st Cir. 1984)(holding conflicting
court orders amounted to exceptional circumstance justifying relief); Belanger, 598 F.Supp
at 606 (D. Me. 1984)(granting relief because of timely appeal and court's change of law
durin6Pendency of appeal).
See Brown, 96 F.R.D. at 166 (holding change in decisional law does not justify
60(b)(6) relief); Belanger, 598 F.Supp at 606 (granting relief because of timely appeal and
court's change of law during pendency of appeal).
47 96 F.R.D. 166 (D. Me. 1982).
48

49

Id. at 172.
Id. at 167-68.

'0 Id. at 167.
"' Id. at 172.
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request may have been more compelling.5 2 The court also pointed to the
plaintiff s failure to appeal as further support for its holding. 53
Two years later, the same court came to a different result when
analyzing a similar issue.54 In United States v. Belanger55 , the defendant
moved for relief from judgment under 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6). 6 The court
granted the plaintiff summary judgment in an action to foreclose a
mortgage on defendant's property. The defendant did not respond to the
motion and accordingly the court granted it pursuant to Maine local rule
58
19(c).

While the appeal was pending, the Maine local rule was rendered
inoperative by another decision. 59 The court granted the defendant's
60(b)(6) motion based on two facts: the (1) change of law and (2) the
defendant's timely motion for relief before the time for appeal had run
out.6° Although a mere change in law is ordinarily not proper
ground for
61
relief under 60(b)(6), in this case, the court granted relief.
The First Circuit has denied motions for relief based on a change of
law where the plaintiff did not appeal, and the "subsequent decisions did
not render the continued application of the injunction inequitable., 62 The
First Circuit has also denied relief where the defendant moved to correct a
clerical error under 60(b)(1), which was the clerk's erroneous addition of
prejudgment interest. 63 The district court initially granted the motion to
correct the judgment under 60(b)(1).64 The plaintiff appealed, and the court
reversed the amended judgment.65 On appeal, the court denied the motion
because it found the mistake was an error of law, and the defendant had not
filed his motions within applicable time limits. 66

52 Id.

53 See Brown, 96 F.R.D. at 170.
'4See United States v. Belanger, 598 F.Supp. 598 (D. Me. 1984) (granting relief after
change in law revised by court and appealed on time).
5 598 F. Supp. 598 (D. Me. 1984).
56 Id at 600.
57 Id.

58 Id. at 600. Local Rule 19(c) provides that a party "shall be deemed to have waived
objection to a motion unless he files a written objection within ten days after the filing of
the motion. Id.

59Id. at 600.

60Belanger, 598 F. Supp at 601.
61 Id.

62 See Lubben v. Selective Service, 453 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1972) (refusing to
modify injunction under 60(b)).
63 See Scola v. Boat Frances, 618 F.2d 147, 152-153 (1st. Cir. 1980)(denying 60(b)(6)
relief where no appeal filed under 60(b)(l)).
64Id. at 150.
65 Id. at 155.
66Id. at 153.
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C. Attorney Misconduct
Attorney misconduct or negligence is another factual situation
where judicial decisions conflict. 67 In a 1969 case, the court granted
60(b)(6) relief where an attorney's failure to prosecute a client's case
68
resulted in its dismissal and the client was unaware of the gross neglect.
A similar factual situation existed in Brooks v. Walker.69 In Brooks,
a client moved for 60(b)(6) relief when his attorney's failure to properly
prepare for trial resulted in an acceptance of a settlement. 70 The
Massachusetts district court denied relief, and noted that a settlement 3f
$160,000 on the facts of the case was not reason enough to be considered
within the scope of 60(b)(6).7 The court suggested that a denial of any
relief would present a far more compelling case under 60(b)(6).72
Two other 60(b)(6) motions alleging attorney misconduct were
denied on "freedom of choice" grounds.73 In Chang,7 4 the plaintiff filed a
racial discrimination complaint with one attorney and then switched to
another attorney.75 The second attorney experienced personal problems
during the pendency of Chang's claim, including suspension of his license
and an indictment for distribution of cocaine.7 6 The attorney failed to
inform Chang that the case was lost until nearly a year later.77 On these
facts, the Appeals Court upheld the lower court's denial of 60(b)(6) relief,
noting that had the attorney filed a claim, the court would have had no
jurisdiction and that Chang was aware of his attorney's decision to seek the
dismissal.7 8
67

See e.g., King v. Mordowanec,46 F.R.D. 474, 480 (D. R.I. 1969)(granting relief

when client unaware of counsel's gross neglect); Brooks v. Walker, 82 F.R.D. 95,
98(denying relief where plaintiff consulted other lawyers, received money, and caused
prejudice to other party) (D. Mass. 1979); Ojeda-Toro v. Rivera-Mendez et al, 853 F.2d
25, 31 (1 st Cir. 1988) (affirming lower court's denial of relief where plaintiff participated in
neglect and exercised choice); Marderosian v. Town of Spencer, 170 F.R.D 335, 341 (D.
Mass. 1997) (granting relief due to actual conflict of interest between plaintiff and attorney
and jury prejudiced) ; Chang v. Smith, 778 F.2d 83, 85 (1st Cir. 1985)(denying relief where
harm resulted from strategic choice to take voluntary dismissal).
68 See King, 46 F.R.D. at 480.
69 See 82 F.R.D. 95, 96-97.
70 See id. at 96.
71 Id.
72 See id. at 98.

73 See Chang v. Smith, 778 F.2d 83 (1st Cir. 1985).; Ojeda-Toro v. Rivera-Mendez et
al., 853 F.2d 25(lst Cir. 1988).
14 778 F.2d 83 (1985).
71 Chang, 778 F.2d at 84.
76 Id. at 85.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 9. See also Ojeda-Toro, 853 F.2d at 30. In this case, the court cited Chang to
support its denial of relief to a plaintiff who was aware of her counsel's delinquency and
chose to keep him as counsel. Id. at 30.
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The court granted relief under 60(b)(6) upon a showing of the
extraordinary circumstances involving a conflict of interest in the movant's
attorney.79 In Marderosian v. Town of Spencer,8 ° the defendant filed a
motion for relief asserting exceptional circumstances. 8' The Massachusetts
district court found that the defendant, as a layperson, could not be
expected to recognize the potential conflict, thereby dispensing with the
choice distinction.82 Next, the court found that counsel's closing argument
may have actually prejudiced the jury.83 The court also found that defense
counsel's erroneous advice to the defendant was kept from the jury, and all
of the findings were extraordinary circumstances warranting relief from
judgment.84
IV. COMPARISON OF SUPREME COURT AND FIRST CIRCUIT
A comparison of United State Supreme Court Cases and First
Circuit cases reveals several discernible standards under which courts have
granted 60(b)(6) relief. 85 In United States v. Baus,86 the First Circuit Court
of Appeals analogized its reasoning to the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Klapprott.87 The court found the circumstances in Baus to be extraordinary
79 See Marderosian, 170 F.R.D. 335, 341(explaining actual conflict existed between
town counsel and police chief).
80 170 F.R.D. 335, 337.
81 Id. at 337.
82 id. at 341.
83 Id. at 342.
84 Id.
85 See Link v. Wabash, 370 U.S. at 633 (1962)(suggesting relief from failure to
prosecute available under 60(b)(6)); Klapprott v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 384 at 390
(1949)(finding extraordinary circumstances present where petitioner jailed during all phases
of default proceedings); Rivera et al v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 921 F.3d at 395 (1 st Cir.
1990)(justifying district court use of 60(b)(6) discretion to clarify conflicting court orders);
United States v. Baus, 834 F.2d at 1124 (i s ' Cir. 1987)(reversing district court after finding
60(b)(6) extraordinary circumstances consisting of material breach of settlement
agreement); Marderosian v. Town of Spencer, 170 F.R.D. at 342 (D. Mass 1997)( granting
relief upon finding of attorney conflict of interest and no prejudice to opposing side);
United States v. Belanger, 598 F.Supp. at 601 (D. Me 1984)(granting relief from judgment
where court changed rule after judgment and prior to appeal expiration); King v.
Mordowanec, 46 F.R.D. at 479 (D.R.I. 1969)(granting relief from dismissal where plaintiff
unaware of attorney's gross neglect).
86 834 F.2d 1114 (s1' Cir. 1987).
87 Baus, 834 F.2d at 1121-1123; Klapprott, 69 S. Ct. at 390. The Baus court noted the

petitioner in Klapprot waited four years to file for 60(b)(6) relief, while the petitoner in
Baus waited five years before seeking relief. Baus 834 F.2d at 1117; Klapprott, 69 S. Ct. at
390. Although the delays were caused by different reasons, in Klapprottthe petitoner was in
the physical custody of the government, while in Baus, the petitioners were lulled into a
false sense of security by claims of three successive Assistant United States Attorneys that
they would not be prosecuted. Baus, 834 F.2d at 1117; Klapprott, 69 S. Ct. 390. In both
cases, the court held they were reasonable delays. Baus, 834 F.2d at 1117; Klapprott, 69 S.
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because the government assured the complainants that it would not attempt
to collect a debt and later changed its position. The government
substantially delayed enforcing its rights under settlement agreement, and
it breached its obligations under the stipulation agreement. 8 8 Similarly, in
Klapprott, the government held the petitioner in physical custody when a
default citizenship judgment entered against him. 89 In both cases, the
parties seeking relief were victims of faultless delay, and, therefore, the
delay before seeking relief caused the court to grant 60(b)(6) motions in
different factual circumstances. 90
In Rivera et al. v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 91 the court granted
relief under 60(b)(6) and affirmed to cure procedural defects in the filing of
an appeal. 92 The delay of twenty-three days, far less than the five-year
delay in Baus and the delay in Claret, was reasonable under the
circumstances.93 The cases therefore do not reveal a definitive pattern of
factual standards, just very fact -specific balancing test in each case.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The attorney misconduct line of cases demonstrates only the gross
neglect of an attorney will trigger 60(b)(6) relief, and, in some cases, even
gross neglect alone is not enough. 94 There is similar discordance in the
change of law line of cases.95 The ambiguous wording of the rule has been
interpreted narrowly, leaving legal scholars initial concerns unrealized. 96
Due to the other corrective remedies available under Rule 60(b) (1) - (5),

Ct. 390.
98 Baus, 834 F.2d at 1122.
89 Klapprott, 69 S. Ct. at 390.
90 See supra note 72.

9' 921 F.2d 393 (I s Cir. 1990).

92 Rivera et al v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 921 F.2d 393 (i s Cir. 1990).
There were several orders issued concerning an incorrect naming of the parties on plaintiff
Rivera's appeal from a lower court denial of a motion for reconsideration. Id. Later in a
defense motion for clarification, the lower court reversed an order granting the plaintiffs
motion to amend their notice of appeal. Id. The defendant's motion was under rule 60(b)(6)
and the appeals court affirmed the lower court. Id.
93 Id. at 395. See also Klapprott, 69 S.Ct. at 390; Baus, 834 F.2d at 1122.
94 See Chang v. Smith, 778 F.2d 83, 85 (1st Cir. 1985) (denying relief from "strategic
decision" to take voluntary dismissal despite suspension of counsel during litigation);
Marderosian v. Town of Spencer, 170 F.R.D. 335, 341 (D.Mass 1997) (granting relief when
conflict of interest created by simultaneous representation of town and plaintiff); King v.
Mordowanec, 46 F.R.D. 474,480 (D. R.I. 1969) (granting relief where plaintiffs unaware of
counsel's gross neglect).
95 See Brown v. Clark, 96 F.R.D. 166, 173 (D. Me.1982) (holding change in
decisional law not grounds for relief under Rule); United States v. Belanger, 598 F.
Supp598, 601 (D. Me. 1984)(holding change in local rule can be a ground for relief).
96 See supra note 6.
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courts only grant 60(b)(6) relief in very specific factual contexts.9 7 The
cases suggest that in order to gain 60(b)(6) relief, the motion must be
brought within a short time after the one-year appeal period and must be
the only alternative for the petitioner.9" The courts frequently describe the
lack of choice available to the petitioners when granting relief.99
Each case is very fact specific, and the rule has consistently been
narrowly construed. No consistent pattern or specific set of facts govern
the application of the Rule, and its power is limited. The cases suggest that
an attorney bringing a claim for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must present a
compelling reason for the delay in seeking relief, and should present a
strong factual argument that the value of finality must give way to justice
in a particular case. Accordingly, courts should continue to carefully use
the Rule, reserving it for specific cases of injustice, and continue to protect
the value of finality in litigation.
Mary C. Cavanagh

97 See supra note

6.

See supra note 16.
99 See supra notes 16,69.
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